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Agriculture was the most important activity in the 
Colombian economy in the 1970s. It contributed 
2 5 % of the total gross domestic product, absorbed 
32% of the labour force and generated about 7 5 % of 
total exports. In the middle of the decade the country 
experienced an unexpected boom in coffee and cer-
tain illegal products which, in conjunction with a 
stronger influx of external resources, strengthened 
the position of international reserves. However, at 
the end of the decade the world recession, the fall in 
international export prices and the accumulated 
exchange rate slippage were sapping the economy's 
strength —a situation accentuated by the persistence 
of structural rigidities. 
In 1981, faced with the resurgence of a trade 
deficit and inflation, the authorities voluntarily 
introduced a first programme of gradual adjustment, 
an initiative made possible by the availability of 
undisbursed loans and the offer of new resources. A 
second adjustment programme was carried out in 
1984, this time controlled by the International 
Monetary Fund, which gave priority to public 
investment in exports projects, wage reductions, 
restriction of imports, and the establishment of a 
competitive level for the exchange rate. In 1985 the 
imminence of foreign-exchange crisis prompted the 
authorities to introduce more stringent adjustment 
measures in order to cut the external and fiscal 
deficits and check inflation and the drop in reserves. 
Between 1980 and 1984 the agricultural growth 
rate, which had been 4 % a year in the 1970s, fell to 
1%, with a consequent decline in the sector's 
contribution to the gross domestic product to 22%. 
Reasons for this phenomenon were the stagnation 
of the production of export crops, their poor 
diversification, and the drop in food production. On 
top of this came the decline in earnings from exports 
other than coffee as a result of the world recession. 
•Economist. Consultant to the Joint liCI.AC/l'AO 
Agriculture Division, 
Introduction 
The change in external conditions from the end 
of the 1970s precipitated the well-known debt 
crisis in Latin America at the beginning of the 
1980s. The increasing imbalance in interna-
tional payments halted the practice of securing 
financial growth by means of external borrow-
ing, and various adjustment programmes were 
introduced in the region. 
The effects of the adjustment have been the 
subject of a debate, the heatedness of which is 
matched only by the shakiness of the empirical 
and theoretical arguments of the debators. The 
statistics and the methods are incomplete; the 
period of time is insufficient; there are no theo-
retical models that indicate in advance which 
coefficients will reveal the reactions that can be 
attributed to the use of the adjustment instru-
ments and which indicators will reflect the pres-
ence of structural factors of economic disruption. 
Furthermore, it is increasingly difficult to 
speak of Latin America as a homogenous whole 
evolving in a certain way and reacting alike to 
the external environment. The various countries 
all have their own history and their recent 
behaviour has been increasingly dissimilar. In 
the situation at the beginning of the 1980s the 
closure of the external financial market did not 
affect all the debtor economies by interrupting 
the flow of credit which was sustaining the eco-
nomic expansion. However, the national econo-
mies had different degrees of vulnerability in the 
medium term and each had its own peculiar 
immediate reaction. 
For all these reasons any analysis of the 
effects of the adjustment on Latin America's 
farming sector must proceed with caution. The 
faster modernization of some economies, the 
different starting points (in the sense that agri-
cultural structures were organized and deve-
loped in different ways), and the differing 
degrees of integration with the world economy 
have produced, with greater emphasis in the 
past 20 years, a new profile of the region's 
economy. 
The term "agricultural sector of Latin 
America" can only be a first approximation. The 
farming economies most oriented towards the 
external markets, towards trade crops or 
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production for industry have different features 
and react differently from the rural structures 
more oriented towards major domestic markets 
for commodities and raw materials or which 
have a greater proportion of traditional and 
family forms of ownership and farming or 
outmoded production methods. 
The use of the term "adjustment" means 
restricting the scope of the analysis with respect 
to the period of action and reaction and the 
1. Main trends in overall 
economic development 
For 20 years from I960 to 1981 the Colombian 
economy grew at an average rate of 6% in real 
terms. The per capita product increased by 3 % a 
year and stood at US$1 380 in 1981. Despite the 
drop in the infant mortality rate, the population 
grew more slowly than in the past owing to 
urbanization, literacy and greater participation 
by women in the labour market. Although this 
development brought greater pressure to bear 
on the jobs market, employment increased by 
about 6% a year between 1973 and 1978. 
The rise in domestic prices accelerated from 
1970. Between 1970 and 1975 inflation was dou-
ble the rate of the previous decade. Its levels of 
between 21 and 25% were far in excess of the 
12% annual average of the 1960s. The main 
causes of the high inflation rate were the deficit 
financing of public expenditure, the pressures of 
food supply, and the monetization of the increas-
ing external incomes almost throughout the 
decade. 
The external situation changed from 1967. 
Partly because the foreign-exchange régime 
adopted in that year reduced the uncertainty and 
instability of transactions and partly because the 
world situation was propitious, in the mid-1970s 
when other developing countries were grap-
pling with the upheaval in external trade condi-
tions, Colombia experienced an unexpected 
surge in coffee and booms in illegal products 
which, together with the increased flow of capi-
i n s t r u m e n t s used . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e 
concentration on one sector relegates the 
macrosystemic and dynamic elements of the 
process to the background. To that extent the 
peculiar structural factors of the agricultural 
sector of the Latin American countries could be 
of lesser importance. However, it will be seen 
that in the study of this situation there is 
constant reference back to the study of the 
genesis and future evolution of the economies. 
tal, strengthened the position of the country's 
reserves. The trade deficit was not to reappear 
until 1981, then owing to the exchange-rate slip-
page, the world recession and the drop in exter-
nal coffee prices. 
Agriculture, manufacturing and trade con-
tributed equally to the aggregate supply, 
responding to the export incentives and the 
expansion of home demand. Coffee was the big-
gest source of agricultural growth in the 1970s. 
Manufacturing grew up to 1974 as a result of the 
export incentives but its growth rate slowed 
owing to the cutback in domestic activity, its 
technological backwardness sheltered by tariff 
barriers, the revaluation of the peso following 
the coffee boom at the end of the decade, and the 
world recession. Economic activity weakened 
from 1978. 
In the case of demand, the biggest contribu-
tion to the expansion was made by the private 
sector in investment and consumption, encour-
aged by the government. But the great impor-
tance of spending on food restricted the capacity 
to diversify consumer demand. 
The growth is also reflected in the changes 
in the factors of production, capital and labour. 
The increase in reserves of capital contributed 
one half of the product growth between 1963 
and 1980, while construction contributed a third 
and more than half of the formation of capital. 
Four-fifths of the contribution of labour was due 
to increases in the active population and one-
fifth to more education. A quarter of the growth 
I 
Economic and agricultural development in the 1970s 
COLOMBIA: THE ADJUSTMENT POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT / A. Martinez 93 
in the period was associated with the adoption of 
economic policies designed to create favourable 
investment conditions and stimulate output and 
exports (World Bank, 1983). 
2. Main trends in agricultural 
development 
Agriculture remained the most important sector 
of the economy in the 1970s, contributing a 
quarter of the gross domestic product. Thirty-
two per cent of the labour force lived in rural 
areas and seven products (rice, cassava, bananas, 
tomatoes, maize, brown sugar and beans) 
accounted for one half of harvests. 
Farm exports contributed between 68 and 
75% of total exports, with coffee's share being 
somewhat variable. Coffee exports made up 
60% of the total in 1977-1980, falling to 4 8 % in 
1981. 
Agriculture grew between 4 and 5 % in Í967-
1979, a point or two below the average for the 
economy. The sector's growth was negative 
from 1982, falling more sharply than the rest of 
the economy. More than half of the increased 
production in the 1970s was due to exports 
growth, of coffee in particular; but the other 
farm exports also recorded increases: starting 
from a small base they doubled in real terms. 
Food imports tripled, with a consequent increase 
in supplies for domestic consumption ( 5 % a 
year) and per capita consumption (2.7%) 
(World Bank, 1983). 
Ninety per cent of the increased coffee 
production was the result of improved 
productivity. The introduction of the caturra 
variety brought changes in sowing practices, 
consumption and yields, and this altered the face 
of the coffee bean economy. In the other crops 
56% of the increases were due to expansion of 
the cultivated area. The advance in tradeable 
products was more remarkable than in 
traditional agriculture, and this introduced a bias 
in favour of production for industry and export 
which reduced the capacity to supply foodstuffs. 
The higher yields were achieved by the use of 
machinery and improved seeds and required 
large investments in irrigation and land 
improvement, whereas the peasant economy 
suffered official neglect, fragmentation of 
properties and marginalization from the 
market, from credit and from technological 
progress (Martinez, 1987). 
Relative agricultural prices moved favoura-
bly, but costs tended to rise even more, impairing 
the profitability of operations. Rural wages 
improved sharply with the coffee boom in the 
second half of the decade. Some exports such as 
bananas and flowers benefitted from the export 
incentives between 1967 and 1974. But the over-
valuation of the peso, which amounted to 47% 
in the last six years of the decade, the emphasis 
on the external promotion of manufactures, the 
export incentives for certain inputs which were 
expensive in the local market —all these factors 
made the export of farm goods less attractive 
during the period. 
3. Visible or latent structural 
problems at the end of the 1970s 
At the end of the 1970s the Colombian economy 
began to show the first signs of slower growth 
under the impact of the world recession and the 
problems of its production structure and the 
domestic market. Agricultural yields began their 
decline and farm production fell in response to 
the drop in the international prices of such items 
as coffee, cotton and sesame. 
After several years of surplus the trade 
deficit returned, partly as a result of the drop in 
external demand and partly because the stabili-
zation measures and measures to reduce the 
monetization of the increasing international 
reserves had had the effect of opening up the 
economy. 
After easing a little in 1978, inflation ended 
the decade at over twice the level of the average 
for the 1960s (27% in 1980 against an annual 
average of 12%). 
The main causes of the new surge of infla-
tion at that time were the rigidities in the agri-
cultural supply, the expansionary financing of 
the fiscal deficit, and the financial anomalies 
caused by the monetary and credit restrictions. 
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II 
The adjustment policies: their main features 
The Colombian experience has peculiarities 
which set it apart from the other debtor coun-
tries of Latin America. When the Mexican crisis 
broke the surface, Colombia still had US$3 700 
million of undisbursed loans, and the decline of 
new commitments in 1983 was due to the limits 
imposed by its authorities and not to the closure 
of the market. Commercial banks continued to 
lend and multilateral banks continued to offer 
programme and other loans. 
This policy of gradual adjustment was 
adopted in Colombia voluntarily —unlike what 
happened in the rest of Latin America— without 
being subject to the rules laid down by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). 
However, from 1982 the international banks 
were pressing for the country to win the support 
of IMF and to this end they reduced their new 
lending to the government. The banks had a 
powerful weapon. In addition to the resources to 
finance the fiscal deficit, the economy urgently 
needed new loans for the oil and coal projects, 
which were acquiring greater importance as a 
result of the external difficulties. The favourable 
1. The global effects of 
the adjustment 
Faced with an imminent foreign-exchange crisis, 
the government adopted in 1985 a stringent 
programme of adjustment. The main goals were 
to cut the external and fiscal deficits to check the 
slide of international reserves, to gain access to 
US$ 1 000 million of credit from the world bank-
ing system with IMF support, and to reduce infla-
tionary pressures. Once the internal and external 
balances had been restored, it would be possible 
to take the road of recovery. 
export prospects were dependent on the imple-
mentation of major works in the energy sector. 
The government then proposed the alterna-
tive of IMF supervision. This option not only 
allowed the retention of relative independence 
in the design of adjustment policy but also 
avoided the costs of restructuring the public debt 
and facilitated the acquisition of new resources 
without having to give State backing to private 
obligations. 
The adjustment programme sought to keep 
the share of public investment in the gross 
domestic product constant in 1985; to give prior-
ity to the oil and coal export projects; to check 
the unruly growth of certain public undertakings 
such as electricity projects; to cut real wages, but 
introducing measures to penalize the lower lev-
els less; to maintain the real incomes of coffee 
producers; to restrict imports growth by 10% in 
1985; to continue the search for a competitive 
level for the exchange rate gradually but firmly; 
and to avoid massive devaluation, the expecta-
tion of which had generated speculation against 
the peso and the reserves. 
The immediate aim of the external adjust-
ment policy was to reverse the outflow of capital 
and goods. The country agreed to accelerate the 
devaluation, dismantle its systems of exports 
subsidies and protectionist tariff barriers, and 
the volume controls on imports.1 
'The policy actually put into practice was heterodox partly in 
that it continued to use controls as simple exchange-rate manage-
ment was not cutting the demand for essential imports or stimulat-
ing exports of non-manufactured goods. Colombia has abundant 
past evidence of lack of response to changes in the exchange rate; it 
is admitted, however, that excessive and permanent overvaluation 
produces undesirable distortions in the allocation of resources. 
Ill 
The general manifestations of the crisis and 
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It also made a commitment to reduce the 
fiscal deficit and keep wage increases below 
inflation. The devaluation accelerated to a real 
25 % ¡n 1985, and reserves rose for the first time 
since 1982 (US$280 million). 
The trade deficit fell to US$417 million in 
1985. Exports had begun to grow in 1984 and 
imports to fall in 1983. The strongest exports 
growth was in coffee, coal, ferronickel, gold and 
flowers. The growth of other exports was nulli-
fied by the fall in oil and derivatives. In view of 
the seriousness of the crisis, an 8% tax was 
imposed on all imports and the volume controls 
were extended. 
Most of the saving on the current account 
went to increase the payment of interest on 
external obligations. In any event, a reduction of 
US$500 million in the current deficit was 
achieved in 1985.2 
Colombia's foreign debt continued to 
increase (at 11% a year) in 1985, mainly as a 
result of new official borrowing. The ratio of 
foreign debt to exports (250%) remained more 
or less unchanged as the two items increased at 
similar rates. 
In the fiscal area the government obtained 
authorization from the National Congress to 
alter the tax structure, and an attempt was made 
to cut expenditure. Fiscal revenue increased by 
47% in 1985, operating expenditure by only 
16%, and investment by 47%. The fiscal deficit 
fell from 35% of total government spending in 
1984 to only 22% in 1985-
The price stabilization targets ran up against 
difficulties in 1985. Despite the stringent policy 
of real wage and salary cuts by means of faster 
devaluation and a tight wages policy, several 
factors nevertheless fuelled inflation. The deva-
luation itself, increased between May andjune to 
the equivalent of a nominal 60% a year, caused 
price rises which were promptly checked by the 
government by means of imports and price con-
trols. But the recovery of the international price 
of coffee and the new external loans meant that 
reserves were no longer a constraining factor. 
JIn local currency the current deficit rose from 6.0 to 6.6% of 
the gross domestic product. The devaluation helped more towards 
reducing the fiscal deficit by increasing the peso revenue of the 
National Coffee Fund. 
The consumer price index had risen 18.3% 
in 1984; the inflation rate of 22% a year in 1985 
was achieved at a high cost in terms of equity and 
the financial equilibrium of public enterprises. 
The greater negative impact of the adjust-
ment policy was evidenced by the regressive 
nature of wages policy. Real wages fell between 
three and 5% in 1985. The cut in real wages was 
needed because of the emphasis on making the 
exchange-rate policy a success. The lower wage 
costs offset the increase in the costs of imported 
inputs caused by the devaluation and made a real 
adjustment of the exchange rate possible. 
Farm and commercial wages fell by 4 and 
5 % respectively, and industrial wages by 3 % ; all 
wage earnings fell in real terms, but the biggest 
losses were among the lower paid. 
The government's vigorous action in the 
financial market and the sharp devaluation pre-
vented a fall in real interest rates, with conse-
quent undesirable effects on investment. 
In short, the 1985 adjustment was successful 
in that it attained the proposed external and 
fiscal targets, although at the cost of cutting 
activity to a dangerous level of gross domestic 
product (2.5% a year). 
To judge by developments in 1986 and early 
1987, the adjustment was sufficient. Several fac-
tors contributed to the 1986 results. The coffee 
boom and external credit resources improved 
the payments indicators. The tax reform 
increased fiscal revenue while at the same time 
freeing the purchasing power of wage earners. 
Economic activity recovered in all sectors 
except construction, and the gross domestic pro-
duct grew by 5%. If the current talks result in the 
granting of new foreign loans and if private 
investment and production consolidate their 
recent growth, the way would seem to have been 
cleared for a return to longer-term policies. 
2. Effects of the adjustment 
on income distribution 
The adjustment policy has altered both the com-
position of demand and relative prices since 
1983. The impact of the shifts in the pattern of 
demand was not serious between 1983 and 1985, 
according to the only available assessment (Lora 
and Ocampo, 1986). 
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The most important effect was the changes 
in the relative prices of inputs and goods. Real 
rural wages fell, reflecting according to Lora and 
Ocampo the low agricultural growth rate and the 
lag in the minimum wage. The real wages of 
urban and public sector workers increased up to 
1984. In that year they began to fall. The changes 
¡n relative prices at the same moment affected 
other non-wage incomes. The Lora andOcampo 
study distinguishes the impact of the rise in 
relative prices on income distribution from 
other impacts, and ¡t finds that it benefitted rural 
landlords most and peasants a little, while 
imparing wage incomes; the first two groups 
gained 1.5% in total income in 1985. 
Urban landlords also had to lose because the 
rent surcharge was fixed at 10% from 1983, 
below the inflation rate of between 17 and 23% 
in the 1980s. 
A recent assessment of the impact on 
incomes calculated the results in terms of the 
Colombia's agriculture sector grew only 1% 
between 1980 and 1984, whereas in the two 
previous five-year periods it had grown at an 
average annual rate of about 4%. At the same 
time the share of the farm product in the gross 
domestic product fell from 23.9% in 1975 to 
22% in 1985. But these figures do not convey the 
qualitative changes in the sector's output. Food 
self-sufficiency declined in the period, and the 
value of food imports rose steadily. The 
improved productivity of tradeable crops 
recorded up to 1975 came to a halt, and the 
diversification of farm exports slowed down. 
The concentration of income, the smaller 
domestic market and the technological model 
adopted in farming are what shape the sector's 
present profile, which is largely a result of the 
development route chosen by Colombia, which 
has stimulated the urban economy and produc-
tion for export. 
For the purposes of evaluating the impact of 
the adjustment policy on Colombia's farming 
real income and employment level of the groups 
studied. This work shows that the capitalists 
bore the weight of the recession and the macro-
economic adjustment as they lost income from 
1981, while peasants and rural landlords had 
better incomes in real terms, with a remarkable 
jump in 1985 producing increases of 30% over 
the real 1980 levels. 
The excellent performance of the economy 
in 1986 led to an improvement in private profits 
which was not accompanied by a rise in the share 
of wages in the national income. 
Activity maintained a recovery rate in 1987, 
but the wages lag and the paralysis of important 
public investment programmes have generated 
civil and trade-union pressure for proper provi-
sion of services and wage increases which should 
lead to a change in the distribution of the benef-
its of the economic recovery. 
sector and on rural society, it is important to 
distinguish within the model the results which 
constitute responses to the ad hoc shock mea-
sures used in the management of the external 
imbalance in the 1980s from the effects of other 
phenomena which are merely the age-old 
expression of historical difficulties of the farm-
ing sector in the Colombian economy and conse-
quences of the development model. 
Traditional exports of farm and manufac-
tured goods were affected more by the world 
recession than by the domestic measures. The 
fall in export earnings as a result of the drop in 
prices and demand for agricultural exports was 
accentuated by the reversal of the coffee boom 
when external prices fell sharply, and it revealed 
in the first years of the current decade the scale of 
Colombia's industrial and exports weakness 
(.Misión de Empleo, 1986). 
The recession has bitten deep in recent 
years: the product grew at barely 2.2% a year 
between 1979 and 1985; the slow population 
IV 
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growth rate of 1.8% a year led to a small increase 
in the per capita product, in contrast to the Latin 
American experience of the 1980s. Industry and 
the farming sector showed little growth (1.4% a 
year on average). Although services grew faster 
than the average at 3.2% a year, this growth was 
two points lower than in the previous period. 
Coffee earnings increased little in real terms 
in the 1986 coffee boom and their effect does not 
seem to be very great. The smaller harvest, a 
result of the age of the modernized estates, will 
reduce the demand for labour by 65 000 tempor-
ary and 16 000 permanent.jobs between 1987 
and 1988, and this will come on top of the past 
reduction of 139 000 and 35 600 jobs respec-
tively between 1983 and 1985. Unless invest-
ment is made in infrastructure or transfers are 
made through the National Coffee Fund, the 
Agricultural Financial Fund and the DRI Fund to 
maintain coffee productivity, reduce the social 
inequalities and guarantee a stronger demand 
for farm products in the years to come, any coffee 
booms will lose a large part of their impact on 
the aggregate demand. 
1. Agricultural employment 
Agricultural employment accounted for 59.2% 
of the total in 1938,49% in 1964, and 32.7% in 
1984. The sector's contribution to the creation of 
new jobs was 18% between 1951 and 1980, but it 
contributed only 12% in the first four years of 
the 1980s. This loss of strength was also found in 
manufacturing. Industrial jobs provided 17.5% 
of the total in 1980 but had fallen to 16.4% by 
1984. Industrial growth generated21.3% of new 
jobs between 1951 and 1980, but between 1980 
and 1984 industry provided barely 4% of the 
new jobs in the labour market. Services gener-
ated over 70% of the new jobs between 1980 and 
1984, 80% of them concentrated in the urban 
areas of the country. This "tertiarizatíon" of the 
economy, which is apparently in line with world 
trends, has peculiar features in the Colombian 
economy, as in other developing countries. The 
increasing importance of services conceals forms 
of underemployment, temporary work, changes 
in hiring practices, and own-account activities of 
varying profitability, the analysis of which 
demands not only a breakdown of figures but 
also, and more importantly, a redefinition of 
categories for a services economy, and a treat-
ment which incorporates "informality" and "ter-
tiarization" as simple economic manifestations 
in the present phase of the cycle. The similarity 
between the farming sectors's contributions to 
job creation and to production growth in the 
country (around 20%) for three decades indi-
cates stability in the growth of the sector's pro-
ductivity, which reduces underemployment and 
reveals the degree of modernization of farming. 
More so than in other Latin American countries, 
in Colombia agricultural growth is due to the 
incorporation of technology and capital (Elias, 
1985). 
The demand for labour for maintenance and 
harvesting work fell by about 10% in the 1984-
1985 coffee year. As the Misión de Empleo notes, 
coffee-growing has not had the ability assigned 
to it by some people to compensate for the loss of 
vigour in the non-coffee farming sector; the 
increase in its demand for labour has not been 
large, nor has it absorbed migrant workers. 
Increases in labour productivity have limited the 
expansion of coffee jobs resulting from the more 
intensive use of labour in the cultivation of the 
caturra variety. The labour demand for the harv-
est is concentrated in October and November 
and only at that time can there be any question of 
taking on more migrant workers in the coffee 
zone (Errázuriz, 1986). 
The estimates of employment in the non-
coffee sector do not allow any conclusions to be 
drawn about the behaviour of the labour demand 
in other crops, but they do indicate trends: mixed 
crops determined the cycle of farm jobs; tradea-
ble crops provided increasingly fewer days of 
work per hectare; the lower demand for cotton 
and rice was not made good by the higher output 
of bananas (for export), sugar cane, African 
palm oil and sorghum. 
At the regional level, there was a redistribu-
tion in favour of the eastern zone, which pro-
vided more than 35 % of the jobs in mixed crops, 
whereas in 1976 its demand for labour was only 
27.5%, and to the detriment of the Atlantic zone 
where the share in the demand for labour fell 
from 16.5 to 12.5% between the two years in 
question. The central and Pacific zones lost a 
small part of their shares. 
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2. Expenditure in the agricultural sector 
Changes in public expenditure and the adminis-
trative and institutional capacity of the State are 
the principal reasons for the sector's recent loss 
of strength. 
Analysis of the budgetary allocations to the 
agricultural sector, the implementation capacity 
of the institutions and the distribution of spend-
ing on operation and investment produced the 
following results: 
a) The percentage of budgetary funds allocated 
to the Ministry of Agriculture fell steadily 
between 1975 and 1982 from 2.96 to 1.58%; 
it then recovered to 3.4% in 1984 but in 
1985 fell back to 2.39%, below the 1975 
level; 
b) The farming sector and its decentralized 
institutions showed a poor implementation 
capacity both in the central nucleus, which 
suffered definite reductions in its alloca-
tions, and in the subsidiary institutions, 
which received increasing amounts; 
c) With respect to the distribution of expendi-
ture, there was a sustained rise in the bud-
geted and actual spending on operation. The 
growth rate of these two items was positive 
throughout the period 1975-1985, with a 
relative slowdown between 1980 and 1982, 
and in 1984-1985 it was the reason for the 
increase in transfers as a percentage of oper-
ating expenditure at the expense of personal 
services. Transfers amounted to under 2% 
of the farming sector's spending in 1975 but 
almost 10% in 1985. The proportion of 
operating expenditure in the sectoral total 
grew to the same extent from 8% in 1975 to 
15% in 1985. The proportion of investment 
spending changed little. It lost five points in 
1983 from its 1975 share of 85 %, but in 1985 
it recovered to 8 3 % . The share of invest-
ment was fairly stable in the 1980s except in 
1983 when, owing to the adjustment, the 
budgeted and actual debt service both 
increased; 
d) Public investment in land improvement has 
fallen 6 5 % in real terms since 1971; in 1970 
it represented 0.6% of the agricultural gross 
domestic product, but in 1983 only 0.14%; 
since 1973 spending on irrigations works 
has practically ceased (Balcázar and Supe-
lano, 1986). Spending on physical infras-
t r u c t u r e , inc lud ing o p e r a t i o n and 
maintenance of the irrigation zones and the 
supplementary works, fell from almost 2% 
of the agricultural gross domestic product in 
1981 to under 0.5% in 1985. Expenditure on 
agricultural research, according to the Office 
of Agricultural Sector Planning (OPSA), 
which includes the management of the cen-
tres and stations, retained its share of about 
0.4% in the agricultural gross domestic pro-
duct between 1970 and 1985. But when 
expenditure on research and development is 
compared strictly with the sectoral product, 
it falls appreciably from 6.51% in 1970 to 
0.25% in 1981-1982 (Balcázar and Supe-
lano, 1986). 
e) The resources of the institutes responsible 
for maintaining the expansion of the com-
mercial farming subsector, the Colombian 
Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology, and 
Land Improvement (HIMAT) and the 
Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA), 
increased much more than those of the 
Colombian Institute of Agricultural Reform 
(1NCORA) which is concerned with the pea-
sant economy (table 1); this demonstrates 
once again the bias of spending policy in 
favour of commercial agriculture and pro-
duction for export; 
f) The external debt of the decentralized insti-
tutions rose at a dizzying rate, making inde-
pendence in programme implementation 
more difficult and increasingly subject to 
directives from international financial insti-
tutions, and undermining the co-ordination 
capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The macro-economic policies designed to 
facilitate the working of market mechanisms in 
the allocation of resources in economies such as 
Colombia's affect farming activities in several 
ways. The overall reduction of expenditure in 
order to correct the fiscal deficit has a greater 
impact on a sector in which the public contribu-
tion is crucial in the provision of physical infras-
tructure, basic research and development, price 
stabilization, commercial intermediation, the 
supply of inputs and loans on terms which gua-
rantee average profitability, and the promotion 
of exports. 
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Table 1 
COLOMBIA: INVESTMENT BUDGET AND IMPLEMENTATION 





























































































Source: Informe financiero. May 1986, p. 64. 
Note: PD: Final budget, in millions of pesos. 
EP: Implemented, in percentages. 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN TOTAL CREDIT 









Source: Bank of the Republic (1985). 
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3. Agricultural credit 
The share of the farming sector in total credit 
was slightly higher than its contribution to the 
product (table 2), and its growth was in step 
with the growth of the sector and of total credit 
(Sarmiento, 1986). 
However, the general policies adopted in the 
1980s changed the nature of the sector's borrow-
ing and accentuated biases which were already 
emerging in earlier decades. 
The acquisition of resources became more 
expensive, as in the end did the financial terms 
of the official funds which were formerly instru-
ments of agricultural promotion. The quest for 
realistic interest structures in the credit market 
and for homogeneity in the treatment of differ-
ent activities reduced the credit subsidy in the 
areas in which it was still available. The resour-
ces for farm marketing are insufficient, and the 
official lending institutions are not entirely com-
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mitted to making the machinery work better, 
nor are they carrying out their original functions. 
The Caja Agraria (Agricultural Savings Bank), 
the official intermediary specializing in small 
and medium-sized savers, is looking increasingly 
like a commercial body and the Agricultural 
Financial Fund discriminates in its lending 
against persons not assisted by banking 
intermediaries. 
Moreover, the financing of the foreign debt 
of the Agricultural Marketing Institute (IDEMA) 
leaves no room for more flexible treatment from 
the standpoint of the monetary implications of 
the expansion of agricultural credit. 
1. Agricultural production 
Agricultural production has been weakening in 
the past 15 years. Table 3 shows its growth 
broken down by group of farm products. The 
most important groups of products (oil crops, 
grains and sugars) followed the agricultural cycle 
described above. Output increased in the first 
five years of the 1970s; in the following period it 
stabilized and fell slightly, and in the first years 
Table 3 
COLOMBIA: GROWTH OF AGRICULTURAL 












































The mixture of the promotion and monetary 
functions in the Bank of the Republic (the cen-
tral bank) has always been a source of conflict 
between the objectives of the policies of stabili-
zation and of sectoral stimulus, laying the invest-
ment plans and the production of the products 
financed open to uncertainty (Sarmiento, 1986). 
The drop in agricultural activity and the 
higher cost of imported machinery and credit 
caused a slowdown in the growth of lending for 
land-improvement and infrastructure works and 
for farm machinery from 1982, which can be 
seen from an analysis of the demand for inputs 
and the scale of the increase in farm costs in the 
sector's crisis. 
of the 1980s the growth rates became zero or 
negative. The production of legumes, which was 
three times the growth average in the early 
1970s, has fallen spectacularly in the past 
10 years. 
The 20 crops which account for 9 5 % of the 
country's agricultural production (without coffee 
recorded substantial falls in physical production 
between 1980 and 1985. Of the most important 
crops, only African palm oil and sugar cane 
showed any improvement. 
The areas sown and harvested tended to 
decline or remain unchanged, so that the produc-
tion increase in the past five years was due to 
higher yields. 
Livestock production achieved better results, 
with falls between 1981 and 1982 and a relative 
recovery from 1983 (table 4). Taking the pro-
ducts individually, only milk and chicken produc-
tion can be considered acceptable during the 
1980s. Beef production fell 1.5% as an annual 
average; pork production rose 0.6% a year and 
egg production 1.6% (Balcázar and Supelano, 
1986). 
There are several reasons for the decline in 
the agricultural product in recent years. The 
most important on the supply side is the neglect 
of the importance of the peasant subsector, 
V 
Restrictions and determinants of agricultural development 
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Table 4 
COLOMBIA: VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1981-1986 
Agriculture with coffee 
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Source: Calculations by the National Planning Deparment/UEA an the basis of Ministry of Agriculture data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
which has suffered the full force of the fiscal and 
monetary correction policies adopted by the 
government in this decade. The calculations 
made by the Conference of Governmental 
Statisticians of the Americas (CECA) and by 
A. Machado show that the peasant economy 
provides between 35 and 4 3 % of livestock 
production, between 27 and 42% of foods for 
direct human consumption, and between 19 and 
2 3 % of raw materials for industry. 
Second in importance is the technological 
model adopted in farming, which produced high 
yields in the 1970s but began to run out of steam 
at the end of that decade and moved into crisis in 
the 1980s. This model, characterized by its high 
component of imported inputs, bias in favour of 
the intensive use of capital, imitation of the cost 
structures of the input-supplier countries, and 
required investment levels incompatible with 
domestic resources produced, respectively, 
increasing dependence on and vulnerability to 
changes in the external sector of the economy, a 
fall in farming jobs, a failure to advance towards 
a more competitive supply at the international 
level, and a need to support activities with sub-
sidy and exemption measures (as in cotton and 
beans) which ended by increasing and fuelling a 
structure of relative prices which distorted the 
allocation of resources (Balcázar, 1985). 
Third in importance are factors associated 
with movements in farm profits; these factors 
have still not been sufficiently evaluated but they 
do seem to explain the temporary falls in the 
supply of certain goods. The higher cost of 
inputs caused by the faster rate of devaluation, 
and the effects of the commercial and tax policies 
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which exposed the sector to disastrous competi-
tion from imports and raised its taxes may have 
discouraged agricultural production in 1984 and 
1985; changes in these policies reversed their 
impact from 1986. 
On the demand side, exports of farm 
products other than coffee have fallen in recent 
years and the home demand has risen very 
slowly. Final personal consumption rose barely 
1.9% a year between 1980 and 1984 (Balcázar 
and Supelano, 1986) 
The value of farm imports grew by 26.4% a 
year between 1970 and 1975, 24.2% between 
1975 and 1980, and only 2.5% between 1980 and 
1983. Their volume followed a different trend: 
the average annual growth was only 1.2 % in the 
first five years, 20.5% in the second, and 16.7% 
in the last four years. The most seriously affected 
group was direct-consumption products, 
imports of which increased in volume by 2 5 % a 
year in the first years of this decade. 
The value of farm exports other than coffee 
rose by 26% a year between 1970 and 1975 and 
only 11.2% between 1975 and 1980; it fell 1.5% 
between 1980 and 1983. High prices were the 
reason for the increases in these exports in the 
1970s, but in the 1980s the opposite has hap-
pened. Between 1970 and 1975 the volume 
exported increased only 4.9% and in the next 
five years by 9.9%, a rate below the increment in 
the value, in the present decade, despite the 
improvement of 2 % in volume, the value of 
exports without coffee has fallen to almost the 
same extent. The foreign sales which suffered 
most (after coffee) were of raw materials. They 
had been the second strongest item in the 1970s 
(after direct consumption) with an average 
annual increase in value of 28%; in the 1980s 
they fell by the same amount. 
In 1984, as a result of the trade policy and the 
low international prices, farm and agro-
industrial exports without coffee increased 8% 
and imports fell 16%. When coffee is included 
the increase in exports jumps to 14.5%. 
The domestic market, with its weak growth, 
is the high demand component which may 
explain the feebleness of the agricultural 
response in the medium term. Rural wages 
ceased to be an important element in costs; des-
pite their relative increase, in the crops which 
pay the minimum, their share in production 
costs was less than 10% of the share of tradeable 
crops. 
More than 80% of farm output is for direct 
consumption and the rest for industrial con-
sumption; this proportion has remained 
unchanged in the past two decades. Hence the 
importance of increased personal spending on 
food as a driving force of the sector's develop-
ment. According to CEGA calculations, house-
holds which earn up to two minimum wages, 
which account for half of the households sur-
veyed by the National Bureau of Statistics 
(DANE), spent 98% of their monthly income on 
food in 1981. When it is remembered that food 
prices have risen faster than the 1979 total aver-
age, except in 1972, it becomes obvious that the 
policies designed to stabilize prices must be rec-
onciled with the policies to stimulate farm pro-
duction and jobs and the expansion of the 
domestic market as a whole. For these reasons 
any assessment of the short-term adjustment 
policies adopted to cover the fiscal and external 
deficits must take into account the knock-on 
effects which can reverse the positive results in 
the medium term by fuelling the forces which 
generated the original imbalances. 
2. Prices 
Food production is affected less by the move-
ment of input prices than by stability of demand 
and policies of price support and subsidy which 
guarantee the producers some certainty in the 
medium term (Balcázar and Supelano, 1986). 
The implicit prices of agricultural value 
added fell between 15 and 20% between 1975 
and 1985 and this fall must have influenced 
production decisions in the sector. Other factors 
affected relative farm prices in the past decade. 
The overvaluation of the peso, barely corrected 
in 1985, the tariff policy whch has removed the 
sector's protection in recent years, the protec-
tionist practices of trading partners, and the 
exchange-rate and sectoral changes made by 
Colombia's neighbours all aggravated the loss of 
competitiveness of agricultural production in 
relation to the rest of the world. The faster rate 
of devaluation and the adjustment of tariff and 
trade policies in 1985-1986 helped to reverse the 
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negative effects of the earlier measures and 
offset the impact of smuggling in neighbouring 
countries and of farm production subsidies in 
those countries and in the developed countries. 
However, the imbalances are so pronounced in 
the cases of Venezuela and Colombia that in the 
past year Venezuelan products served to hold 
down the inflation rate in neighbouring areas, at 
a time when there was a degree of disorder in 
fiscal and monetary management. 
Although relative prices favoured the farm-
ing sector more than manufacturing in 1970-
1985, the output response did not occur, because 
producer prices moved differently. Initially the 
decline in producer prices was due to increased 
productivity resulting from the introduction of 
improved seeds and investments in infrastruc-
ture and land improvement. Nevertheless, in 
1980 the technological model began to show 
signs of exhaustion. 
The price trend, together with the unfavou-
rable ratio to input costs, meant lower profits 
from farming activities that were also hit by the 
trade and tariff policies which exposed domestic 
production to competition and sought to elimi-
nate State support in the form of subsidies and 
lower taxation. The tendency to "de-administer" 
support prices and restrict the supply of credit 
and fiscal resources for development of an ade-
quate storage and marketing infrastructure 
exposed agricultural investment to even greater 
uncertainty. 
With respect to support prices, in 1982 82% 
of the purchases by IDEMA (Agricultural Mar-
keting Institute) (excluding the cotton marketed 
directly by textile producers) were of tradeable 
products. The rice support differential caused 
the Institute great losses. The activities of 
IDEMA do not bear analysis from the standpoint 
of purely commercial profit; they must be 
assessed in terms of the policies of price support 
and exports promotion. 
Despite the attempted general change of 
direction in the price support policy in the mid-
1970s, IDEMA continued to pay high prices, 
above production costs, which encouraged high 
stocks; this applied more to tradeable crops than 
to traditional crops (beans) in the past decade 
(Chaparro, 1982, cited in Misas and others, 
1986). 
3. Agricultural costs 
Lower farm profits have been cited as one of the 
main causes of the sector's loss of vigour in the 
1980s. An important factor in these lower prof-
its seems to riave been the higher costs of pro-
duction with both local and imported content. 
The implicit deflator of intermediate farm 
consumption grew more than the sector's pro-
duct between 1978 and 1985, and farm prices to 
the producer fell in relation to industrial prices. 
Accordingly, the proportion of intermediate 
consumption increased at the expense of the 
value added in farming. 
The recent economic adjustment measures 
go some way to explain the movement of farm 
production costs. Fertilizer prices initially rose 
in 1985 by 3.2% owing to the 8% surcharge on 
imports; when the exemption was extended to 
private as well as official imports of nutrients, 
the price fell 5.2%. This surcharge also explains 
the 3.4% increase in the cost of pesticides in 
1985. The tax on imported machinery and equip-
ment was in practice increased by the additional 
tax of 10% on value added introduced under Law 
50 in 1984. 
The accelerated devaluation in 1985 
accounted for 23.7 and 27.3% of the increase in 
fertilizer prices. The very short payment periods 
for imports also affected the prices of raw mate-
rials and machinery and equipment. The already 
short periods of 180 days and three years were 
reduced to 90 days for fertilizers and to six 
months for farm machinery and equipment at 
the end of 1984. The discontinuation of the mea-
sure from January 1986 reduced the impact of 
this restriction on price formation and contrib-
uted to the drop of 4.8% in pesticides and 1 % in 
synthetic fertilizers. In 1985 it had contributed to 
the rises of 5.8% for pesticides and 2.9% for 
synthetic fertilizers. The additional requirement 
of 20 days advance deposit increased the cost of 
these two items by 0.7% in 1985. 
The decline in the peso's purchasing power 
affected production costs in other ways. This was 
true of the tariffs of the Colombian Ports Corpo-
ration (COLPUERTOS), charged in dollars, mak-
ing inputs even more expensive. The importer 
paid US$26.82 per ton of urea, 14% of its CIF 
price. When import is permitted via private 
wharves, prices fall almost 20%, and if the raw 
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materials are imported by the owner of the 
wharf for processing by himself, the port costs 
can fall up to 2.4 pesos ad valorem and US$10 a 
ton. If urea was handled in this way, these costs 
would amount to only 8.1% of the CIF value 
(Ministry of Agriculture - National Planning 
Department, 1986). 
The price adjustment policy for natural gas 
affects the cost of fertilizers produced in the 
country. The 25% adjustment in January 1986 
raised the price of ammonia, a basic component 
¡n fertilizers, by 11.5%. The price of synthetic 
fertilizers, under the combination of these two 
effects, rose by 1.7%. 
Colombia had 1.1 million unemployed in 
1985, of whom 100 000 had joined the line 
1. Immediate and longer-term prospects 
of the overall economy 
The increase in unemployment from 10% in 
1980 to 14% in 1985 is one of the most impor-
tant minifestations of the economic and social 
decline in this decade. Similarly, the 10% drop in 
real rural wages is worrying in its implications 
for living standards in the countryside. 
In the strategy outlined in the study by Chen-
ery, commissioned by the government of Belisa-
rio Betancur, farming is given new importance 
both because it will benefit from the global poli-
cies for recovery of economic activity and 
because its characteristic feature as a powerful 
source of foreign exchange and demand for 
labour and domestic resources places it in a 
prominent position with respect to branches 
which are less competitive internationally or 
which have different technical profiles in the use 
of the factors of production (Misión de Empleo, 
1986). 
It remains to be seen whether the exports 
promotion policy will make the necessary choi-
ces to encourage the external sales of products 
which, since they complement the output of the 
purchaser countries, are not subject to protec-
between 1980 and 1985. The level remained at 
about 8% even in the boom periods of recent 
decades, indicating a structural component in 
Colombian unemployment. However, the 
increased unemployment in the past five years 
must be attributed to temporary factors of the 
recession. 
Real rural wages grew sharply between 1958 
and 1962, then remained stable until 1976, after 
which they rose with the 1977 coffee boom and 
fell with the coffee depression. The different 
directions taken by the coffee and inflation cycles 
helped to reduce the difference between rural 
and urban wages at the end of the last decade. 
Recently, however, the gap between these two 
wage incomes has begun to widen again. 
tionist measures; whether this policy will be 
backed up by a reduction of internal costs by 
technical means and by tariff, credit and tax 
management; and whether priority will be given 
to the goal of food self-sufficiency in order to 
reduce the inflationary pressure of the inade-
quate food supply and permit greater diversifica-
tion of the home market. In short, it is to be 
hoped that economic policy will become stable 
and take a long-term view, in order to remove 
the structural shackles on the country's 
development. 
2. The farming sector in 
the next few years 
The farming sector has suffered a serious loss of 
vigour since the last decade. The next few years 
are intended to see the eradication of absolute 
poverty and the resumption of growth in Colom-
bia. In view of the backwardness described above 
and the magnitude of the challenge, the farming 
sector must make radical changes in its struc-
tures, assume a leading position in economic 
'policy, and accept the rise of new groups to cater 
to the needs which will emerge in this process. 
VI 
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The solution of the crisis depends on the 
outcome of the diagnosis which will determine 
farming policy in the immediate future. If the 
debate is won by the argument that agriculture's 
performance is due mainly to the slower growth 
of commercial production brought about by 
exchange-rate and foreign trade policies, then an 
attempt will be made to reduce the discrimina-
tory impact of the industrial protection policies 
and the exchange-rate overvaluation which pro-
duced this decline in agriculture. 
If the crux of the matter lies in the restriction 
imposed by food production on economic expan-
sion, emphasis will be given to the complement-
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